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Abstract 
This research project is part on an ongoing effort in the social sciences to expand the 
understanding of those factors that may influence and promote moral development. Based 
on Lawrence Kohlberg’s developmental theory of moral reasoning, the main focus of the 
current study concerns the exploration of the relationship between moral reasoning and 
relativistic attitudes.  
B-type moral reasoning is a more mature and developed form of reasoning at each of 
Kohlberg’s Stages 2 through 5. Hypotheses regarding the positive associations between the 
frequency of its use and scores on measures of relativism, equity, empathy, and open-
mindedness were generated. Of the 80 possible associations predicted, all were weak, and 
only 2 attained an acceptable level of statistical significance. Possible explanations for 
these results are considered.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: relativism, moral reasoning, moral development, equity, empathy, open-
mindedness, Kohlberg.  
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
This thesis pursues an exploratory investigation of the relationship between relativistic 
attitudes and moral reasoning.  While there are several different philosophical 
interpretations of relativism (See Chapter 2), for our purposes, relativistic attitudes refer to 
the following three distinct modes of thinking: 1) that people believe there are no 
universally valid moral points of view; 2) that what is morally right is dependent on 
context; and 3) that one’s own moral judgments may be different from those of others.  
Such attitudes would appear to inhibit the development of mature moral reasoning 
(Kohlberg et al., 1984). Relativism, however, is an attitude that does recognize the 
existence of multiple points of view. Accordingly, it may be an attitude that nurtures rather 
than inhibits moral development, since the awareness of differing points of view is 
necessary for such development to occur (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  
Moral reasoning refers to one’s ability to reason critically and make judgments about what 
ought to be done in response to moral dilemmas. From Kohlberg’s (1984) perspective, 
moral reasoning develops through stages, with each new stage of moral development 
representing a qualitative reorganization of the individual’s previous patterns of 
prescriptive thought. As they develop, these patterns of thought become more complex, 
differentiated, and adaptive, as each stage integrates the understandings gained at the 
previous stage (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). This is comparable to how one learns and uses 
mathematical skills. For instance, we begin our learning of mathematics by learning the 
basic properties of numbers such as addition and subtraction, then move on to 
multiplication, division, and eventually we are able to solve complex algebraic equations. 
The skills we learned at earlier stages of development do not disappear or become 
something new, but rather they are reorganized and integrated along with the more complex 
math skills we have acquired. The same can be said for the development of moral reasoning 
capabilities (Levine, 1978).  
It must be noted that the present study was motivated by an interest in exploring the 
possible relationships that might exist between relativistic attitudes and moral reasoning. 
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This research does not focus on moral development, or one’s stage of moral development, 
as part of its analysis. Due to time limitations the research was unable to include a 
longitudinal design necessary for investigating the development of moral reasoning in this 
research. Additionally, scoring moral reasoning by stage, in order to research Kohlberg’s 
overall cognitive developmental model, requires extensive training in the analysis of moral 
judgment interviews. The current research, however, does investigate how relativistic 
attitudes may be related to certain qualities/dimensions of moral reasoning that Kohlberg 
identifies in his work; specifically, his conception of “moral type” reasoning (to be 
discussed below). It is important to note, however, that previous research has shown that 
respondents in university samples like the one being used in this study, are typically at the 
second, third or fourth stage of moral development (Colby et al., 1983,1987; Jakubowski, 
1989; Kohlberg et al., 1984; Levine, 1992; Pakvis, 1995; Snarey et al., 1983; Walker et al., 
1982, 1989, 1991).  
If the notion that relativistic attitudes play a positive role in moral development is correct, it 
should be evidenced most clearly by respondents’ recognizing the various claims raised by 
actors in a hypothetical dilemma. A relativistic attitude, by definition, means that an 
individual realizes their own moral judgments may be different from those of others and 
that these views cannot be claimed to be better or worse than another’s. Thus, there is 
reason to believe that the holding of relativistic attitudes could be positively associated with 
the use of cognitive operations such as equity, equality, empathy, and reciprocity; all of 
which can be used to identify the relevance of other persons and their views in order to 
resolve a dilemma. 
While exploring the relationship between relativistic attitudes and moral reasoning does not 
explicitly address development in Kohlberg’s stage model, it is hoped that it will suggest 
the fruitfulness of certain research orientations to be taken in the future regarding 
Kohlberg’s work.    
The present research is organized as follows: Chapter 2 begins by reviewing the theoretical 
foundations upon which the current study is based. In order to appreciate the significance of 
the current research, one must first understand the nature of the cognitive-developmental 
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model underlying it.  Chapter 2 provides an in-depth explanation of the theoretical 
foundations of Kohlberg’s model. In Chapter 3, the methodology and variables employed 
are discussed in detail. Particular attention is paid to explaining the measures used to score 
“global moral reasoning” and “B-Element reasoning.” Chapter 4 discusses the statistical 
procedures used and the results of the statistical analyses. This results section begins with a 
brief description of sample characteristics, followed by the analyses conducted to assess 
possible associations among all the variables. Finally, Chapter 5 presents limitations of the 
current study, followed by possible explanations for the results.  
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Chapter 2 
2 Theoretical Foundations 
The cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning is based on the stage model of 
development initially conceptualized by Jean Piaget (1932). Piaget’s work established an 
understanding that cognitive development emerges from action, as individuals construct 
and reconstruct their knowledge of the world as a result of interactions with their 
environment.  
In “The Moral Judgment of the Child” Piaget suggests that the nature of moral judgment 
can be traced through a developmental sequence by distinguishing two qualitatively distinct 
periods. The first is referred to as the morality of constraint and the second, the morality of 
cooperation (Levine, 1974). The morality of constraint, or heteronomous stage, is the first 
stage of moral development.  According to Piaget, moral reasoning at this stage is 
concerned with a strict adherence to rules and duties as well as obedience to authority 
figures such as parents, teachers, or God. At this stage, what is “right” is that which 
conforms to commands and what is “wrong” is that which fails to do so (Piaget, 1932).  
The morality of cooperation, or the autonomous stage of moral reasoning, is the second 
stage of moral development. This stage is characterized by the ability to consider rules 
critically and to selectively apply these rules based on establishing respect and cooperation 
among individuals. Piaget’s autonomous stage of moral reasoning is based on the idea that 
the ability to act morally comes from a sense of reciprocity and mutual respect that is 
associated with a shift in the child's cognitive structures and their experience with peers 
(1932). Autonomous morality is characterized by the child's understanding that rules are 
made by people, for people. Piaget believed that this kind of relation to the rules develops 
out of cooperative activity among peers, as coordinating one's perspective with that of 
another implies that what is “right” must be agreed upon and based on solutions that meet 
the requirements of fair reciprocity (1932).   
Lawrence Kohlberg (1958) reasserted the basic themes in Piaget’s work on moral 
development and elaborated on Piaget’s research to form a theory that attempts to explain 
the development of moral reasoning beyond the period of late childhood. A fairly extensive 
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review of Kohlberg’s work is required in order for the reader to appreciate the nature of the 
research undertaken by the present author.  
Kohlberg’s (1984) theory explores the idea that individuals begin their moral development 
by first passing through relatively simple stages, initially believing that what constitutes 
good and bad acts is simply determined by conforming to the expectations of authority, and 
then progresses towards more complex stages that involve conceptualizing morality in 
terms of what is just or fair from a variety of perspectives (Passer et al., 2005).  
Kohlberg’s theory holds that individuals pass through moral stages one step at a time as 
they progress from the bottom (Stage 1) to the top (Stage 6) of his model. The six stages of 
moral development, as conceived by Kohlberg, are grouped into three developmental 
levels; the pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional level, each of which 
contains two stages of moral development (See Table 2.1). The second stage of each level 
is considered a more advanced and organized structure that generates moral judgments that 
are congruent with the general social perspective of that level (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). 
The three levels and six stages of moral development are best viewed as being different 
understandings of how individuals conceptualize their relationship to the social world, 
persons, and society’s rules and expectations. Level 1, the pre-conventional level, is 
typically the perspective of a child who views society’s rules and expectations as being 
externally imposed by authority figures (Kohlberg et al., 1984). As a result, any and all 
authority figures are seen as a source of what defines something as good or bad, and their 
rules must be obeyed. Level 1 contains Stage 1 and Stage 2 of moral development.  At 
Stage 1 the consequences of an action are thought to determine whether the act is good or 
bad, as intentions behind actions are not considered. Avoidance of punishment and 
obedience to authority figures are values in their own right and the individual is purely 
egocentric, as only the self is considered when attempting to resolve dilemmas.  As a result, 
one is unable to differentiate others’ wants and needs from their own (Kohlberg, 1981; 
Reed, 2008).   
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Table 2.1: Kohlberg’s Six Stages of Moral Development 
 
Progression from Stage 1 to Stage 2 occurs due to the recognition that more than one 
perspective may exist in a given situation. In other words, the egocentric and heteronomous 
qualities of Stage 1 begin to break down. The morally right is now seen as being relative to 
the situation and one’s own perspective. Each individual is now seen as having his or her 
own interests to pursue, and these pursuits may be in conflict with one another.  Moral 
Level I                                                    Level II                                            Level III 
Pre-Conventional Social 
Perspective Level: 
 
Society’s rules and expectations are 
externally imposed by any, and all, 
authority figures. Here, rules must be 
obeyed. 
Conventional Social 
Perspective Level: 
 
Society’s rules and expectations 
have been internalized and used to 
understand various types of 
relationships. Value is placed on 
maintaining the rules.  
Post-Conventional Social 
Perspective Level: 
 
Society’s rules are understood and 
accepted on the basis that general 
moral principles underlie those 
rules. Here, individuals are able to 
make distinction between their own 
principles and the rules set by 
authority figures/society. Conflict is 
resolved by referring to principles, 
not social conventions.  
 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 
- Consequences 
of an action 
determine if it’s 
good or bad.  
 
- Unable to 
differentiate 
wants and needs 
of others from 
your own.  
 
- Unquestioning 
obedience to 
authority figures 
- Different people 
have different 
perspectives/claims  
 
- Each person’s 
primary goal is to 
pursue own 
interests.  
 
- No balance or 
priority given to 
importance of 
claims. 
- Must maintain 
relationships and 
adhere to norms. 
 
- Set of shared 
moral norms 
exists (emphasis 
on pro-social 
behaviour). 
 
- Golden Rule: 
treat other 
people the way 
you want to be 
treated. 
-Social system is 
a set of codes 
and procedures 
that apply to all. 
 
- Pursuit of own 
interests only 
legitimate when 
coordinated with 
maintenance of 
socio-moral 
system. 
 
- Moral 
judgments made 
in reference to 
doing one’s 
duty.  
- Awareness of 
certain rights 
that one believes 
all human 
beings would 
choose to build 
into society. 
 
- Each person 
obligated to 
uphold society’s 
codes 
 
- Possible for 
laws, norms, 
rights to conflict 
with achieving 
common good.  
- Moral point of 
view that all 
people should 
take as 
autonomous 
persons. 
 
- Social 
interaction is 
based on the 
underlying 
concept of 
maintaining 
trust and 
community.  
 
- Self-chosen 
principles used 
to resolve 
conflicts.  
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reasoning at Stage 2 is motivated by a desire to maximize the realization of one’s own 
needs and wants while minimizing negative consequences to the self. The major limitation 
of this stage is that it fails to provide a way to balance and/or prioritize the importance of 
conflicting claims generated by the different needs and interests of the self and others 
(Kohlberg et al., 1984).  
Level 2 is the conventional level of moral development.  It contains Stages 3 and 4 moral 
reasoning. The conventional level refers to individual reasoning that reflects the 
understanding of the rules of interpersonal relationship and society as well as the 
expectations of authority. This is the level of moral reasoning that most adolescents and 
adults attain (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  At this level “right behaviour consists of doing one’s 
duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order” (Turiel, 1974).   
At Stage 3, one is concerned with maintaining interpersonal relationships and adhering to 
the norms that regulate “good” relationships and define the behaviour of “good” persons 
(Kohlberg et al., 1984).  Here the individual understands the moral significance of mutually 
beneficial interactions, as Stage 3 recognizes shared moral norms that emphasize the 
importance of being a good or pro-social individual within society. There is a clear use of 
the Golden Rule (do unto others as you would have others do unto you) for the first time at 
Stage 3 and “it is expressed as the idea that something is right or fair from one’s point of 
view if one would accept it as right or fair from other’s point of view” (Kohlberg et al., 
1984, p.630). 
At Stage 4 of moral development the individual takes the perspective of a generalized 
member of society in which the individual recognizes the social system as a set of codes 
and procedures that apply impartially to all members (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  The 
individual who reasons at Stage 4 now makes moral judgments that are considered 
beneficial to the group, as the pursuit of individual interests is only legitimate when 
coordinated with concern about the maintenance of the social system (Kohlberg et al., 
1984).  Formal institutions such as legal systems, and the social roles that one plays as a 
member of a social group such as student, employee, or friend, are viewed as being parts of 
a social structure that can mediate conflicting claims and promote a common good. 
Individuals at this stage are aware that there can even be conflicts among individuals with 
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good intentions, so it is necessary to maintain a system of rules to help resolve such 
conflicts (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  In other words, one is aware that the social group 
functions best when each member of the group knows their role and performs that role 
properly (Reed, 2008).  
The third and final level of moral development is the post-conventional level. Here, one’s 
point of view differentiates the self from the rules and expectations of others and defines 
adequate moral judgment in terms of self-chosen principles. At the post-conventional level 
the individual understands and accepts society’s rules, but this acceptance is based on the 
understanding of, and commitment to, general moral principles that underlie these rules. 
Principles are distinct from rules, as they are used to resolve conflicts between rules, 
generate particular rules, and provide a means of viewing concrete moral situations (Colby 
& Kohlberg, 1987).  For example, the wrongness of stealing is based on the principle that it 
violates the rights of the individual.  Individuals at the post-conventional level are able to 
make a clear distinction between their own chosen principles and the rules set by authority 
figures, or society. There is an awareness that in some cases these principles may come into 
conflict with society’s rules, in which case the individual judges by principle rather than 
societal convention (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  
The post-conventional level contains Stages 5 and 6 moral reasoning. The individual using 
Stage 5 moral reasoning is aware of certain values and rights that they believe anyone 
should choose to endorse as members of a society. The validity of existing laws and rules 
are evaluated based on the degree to which they preserve and protect fundamental human 
rights. At this stage the social system is viewed ideally as a contract entered into by each 
individual in order to protect and promote the welfare of all members of society (Kohlberg 
et al., 1984).  
Finally, at Stage 6 of Kohlberg’s model the individual takes on a moral point of view that 
they believe all persons should ideally take toward one another as autonomous persons. 
While Stage 5 is grounded on the notion of contract and agreement, Stage 6 focuses on the 
moral importance of the processes used to reach fair contracts and agreements. Stage 6 
reasoning requires that such processes be consistent with the principle of mutual respect, 
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and consistent with the need to maintain human trust and community.  Stage 6 moral 
reasoning is characterized by one’s capacity to universalize principles of justice such as 
reciprocity and the equality of human rights, as well as by the ability to balance the 
perspectives of persons in order to achieve and maintain justice as fairness (Kohlberg et al., 
1984; Kohlberg, Boyd & Levine, 1990).  
 
2.1 Stages as Form (Structure) and Content 
 
Kohlberg considers a stage to be a structure of cognitive operations that are coordinated 
with categories of content in order to produce moral reasoning. While these categories of 
content (to be described below) are reflexively understood by the individual, Kohlberg 
argues that the underlying structure of cognitive operations that process content are in fact 
“deep structures,” not normally within the range of self-awareness (1984). The cognitive 
operations constituting a Stage 1 structure are equality, reciprocity, and universality. From 
Stage 2 onward, additional operations are utilized in moral reasoning: these are equity, 
universalizability, prescriptive role-taking, sympathy, and empathy (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  
 
In Kohlberg et al. (1984) and in Kohlberg, Boyd and Levine (1990) the above mentioned 
operations, and Kohlberg’s conception of them, are described. The equality operation can 
be understood as an operation of thought that creates a taxonomy, or classification system, 
of persons in relationship to norms and/or types of behaviour; for example, persons who 
obey the law, persons who deviate from the law, persons who are nice, persons who are 
good, persons who are bad, persons who uphold their obligations etc. Reciprocity is an 
operation of thought that provides an exchange logic for understanding the relationship 
between acts and consequences. An example of this would be when a respondent states 
“persons who break the law should be punished.” Kohlberg sees this statement as evidence 
of coordination between the operations of equality and reciprocity.  Equity is 
conceptualized by Kohlberg as an operation that compensates for the equality operation’s 
insensitivity to special circumstances and accordingly, dictates different outcomes for 
reciprocity. If for example, a respondent stated in response to one of Kohlberg’s dilemmas, 
“it is the case that the husband stole a drug for his dying wife, but he should not be 
punished severely, if at all, because he was desperate and felt an obligation to save his wife 
10 
 
because he loves her and had no other option,” Kohlberg would likely interpret this 
judgment as one reflecting a coordination of the operations of equity and reciprocity.  
 
Kohlberg understands the operations of sympathy and empathy to be cognitive processes 
enabling a person to appreciate the circumstances and point of view of others. Prescriptive 
role-taking is conceived as an operation that leads respondents to claim that persons have a 
moral obligation to take into account the point of view of others. Finally, Kohlberg holds 
that the operations of universality and universalizability are operative when respondents 
offer justification for their judgment by generalizing the legitimacy of the choices they 
make. In the case of universality, the respondent makes the claim that his or her judgments 
should be considered correct for all persons. In the case of universalizeability, respondents 
claim that their judgments ought to apply to all persons in similar circumstances.    
 
It is the change in how these operations are coordinated throughout development that 
produces those qualitative distinctions that differentiate one stage structure from another. 
For Kohlberg, the changes in how operations are coordinated is what strengthen and 
support changes in the individual’s understanding of morally relevant content, their 
experience of contradictions regarding such content, and/or their understanding of ‘new’ 
content, which can in turn disequilibrate the structure of cognitive operations.  At Stage 2 
for example, the cognitive operations of equity and equality are operative. Here, equality 
allows the respondent to understand that all persons have the right to pursue their interests 
within the confines of a given legal system. At Stage 2 however, the use of the equity 
operation can also lead individuals to recognize that others have needs that may conflict 
with the rights of persons to pursue their interests. The problem at Stage 2 is that a strategy 
for coordinating operations of equity and equality into one coherent structure has not been 
achieved. Therefore, the tension that can exist between the rights of some and the needs of 
others cannot be resolved. It may be that either the dissonance produced by this tension, 
and/or the introduction to the idea of “good relationships,” enables the individual to resolve 
this issue by orienting the self to a social perspective of Stage 3 (i.e., a view that good 
people recognize that norms regulate good relationships). At Stage 3, equality no longer 
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refers to the rights of persons, but to the rights of good persons who ought to understand the 
obligation one has to respond to others’ needs.  
2.2 Social Perspective Level and View of Persons 
Two core features of the stages of moral development are the categories of Social 
Perspective Level and View of Persons, which are briefly described in Table 2.2.1 (Colby 
& Kohlberg, 1987). Social perspective level (SPL) constitutes the general outlook a person 
uses to reason about what they consider to be morally relevant facts. The individual’s SPL 
is an abstract, universal content category that unifies other content properties of a moral 
judgment. Throughout development it influences, and is influenced by, the structural and 
operational properties of each moral stage. Associated with the SPL at each stage is a View 
of Persons (VOP). The VOP refers to the way in which the individual views other people, 
interprets their thoughts and feelings, and views their role in society. Kohlberg considers 
the VOP of a stage in a manner similar to the SPL, in that it constitutes a general concept 
used to classify and unify characteristics of persons deemed relevant to moral reasoning by 
the individual (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  
The Concrete Individual Perspective is one in which everyone is seen as having his or her 
own interests to pursue. At Stage 1, an egocentric point of view does not allow for the 
consideration of the interests of others and the individual makes moral judgments based on 
the need to follow norms and to avoid negative consequences to the self. The social 
perspective at Stage 2 is that of dyadic reciprocity wherein the individual recognizes that 
others have needs and therefore they can, but need not enter into, some type of reciprocal 
exchange with another person (i.e., persons are not obligated to form exchange agreements 
with each other). What is “right” however, remains relative to the individual and the 
situation (Kohlberg et al., 1984).   
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Table 2.2.1: Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development, Social Perspectives,  and 
View of Persons 
 
Levels of Moral 
Development 
Levels of Social 
Perspective 
Stages 
 
Social Perspective Level View  
Of 
Persons  
 
 
Pre-Conventional 
 
 
Concrete Individual 
Stage 1:  
-Unquestioning 
obedience to authority. 
 
- Physical consequences 
determine goodness or 
badness of an act. 
- Egocentric. 
 
- Following norms allows 
one to make moral 
judgments. 
- No view of persons. 
 
- Moral judgments based on 
relationship to norms. 
Stage 2:  
- Each person’s primary 
goal is to pursue own 
interests.  
- More than one point of 
view. 
 
- Different types of 
reciprocal exchange exist.  
 
- Others can be used as a 
means to an end.  
- People obey or disobey 
norms.  
 
- People have needs and 
desires.  
 
 
Conventional 
 
 
Member-of-Society 
Stage 3:  
- Must maintain 
relationships and adhere 
to norms. 
 
- Golden Rule: treat 
other people the way 
you want to be treated. 
- Norms and relationships 
exist together. 
 
- Norms are what govern 
relationships.  
- People have either good or 
bad intentions.  
 
- Desire for acceptance. 
 
- Motivation is to have 
needs met. 
 
Stage 4:  
-Maintenance of social 
order and fixed rules. 
 
- Obligation to perform 
one’s duty. 
- Now part of larger, 
general social system. 
 
- Consider individual 
relations in terms of their 
place in system.  
- People are now able to 
commit themselves to 
abstract societal 
relationships.  
 
 
Post-Conventional 
 
 
Prior-to-Society 
Stage 5:  
- Right action is agreed 
upon by whole society.  
 
- Each person obligated 
to uphold society’s 
codes 
 
- Values and rights exist 
apart from social 
attachments or contracts.  
 
 
- People are capable of 
entering into contracts with 
others in order to pursue 
own interests.  
Stage 6: 
- Orientation toward 
decisions of conscience 
and self-chosen 
principles 
- Perspective of any rational 
individual recognizing the 
nature of morality. 
 
- Persons are ends in 
themselves.  
- People must be respected 
and treated fairly. 
 
- All people are equal 
communicators. 
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The Member-of-Society Perspective is one in which the individual now understands that 
shared agreements take precedence over individual interests. At Stage 3 individuals are able 
to metaphorically place themselves in another’s position, as well as relate different points 
of view by utilizing the ‘Golden Rule’.  The individual is now aware of shared feelings, 
agreements, and expectations that take precedence over individual interests. The social 
perspective at Stage 4 is that of a general social system. Here, the individual differentiates 
general norms from interpersonal motives and considers individual relations in terms of 
their place in the larger social system (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  
Finally, the Prior-to-Society Perspective refers to a point of view in which the individual is 
aware of values and rules that may logically exist prior to social attachment and contracts. 
At Stage 5, the social perspective is oriented toward distinguishing between a moral and a 
legal point of view, and consists of a moral perspective that is linked with the perspective 
of contractual-legal rights. For example, although the individual recognizes the importance 
of the legal system, they are also aware that it ought to derive its legitimacy from its role in 
establishing and protecting fundamental human rights (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). The 
social perspective at Stage 6 is one that is considered to be “the moral point of view,” or the 
point of view any rational human being would take.  Here, society’s laws and values should 
be ones that any reasonable person could commit themselves to, whatever their place in 
society.  The perspective here is one of mutual respect, as the individual realizes the need to 
treat all others fairly, or rather as “ends” and never as “means.”  Therefore, the others’ point 
of view must always be considered when attempting to resolve a moral dilemma (Kohlberg 
et al., 1984).  
The Social Perspective Level and VOP reflect the general outlook the individual uses to 
reason about morally relevant facts and formulate moral judgments.  SPL and VOP 
influence the conceptualization of content of moral judgments, and this influence is 
manifested differently at each level, as well as at each stage, of moral development. The 
Member-of-Society Perspective for example, is different from the Concrete Individual 
Perspective in that it is able to identify and subordinate the needs of the individual to the 
needs of the group, indicating a concern for the welfare of others that does not exist from 
the Concrete Individual Perspective. Additionally, the Member-of-Society Perspective 
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consists of Stages 3 and 4 moral reasoning, each of which has its own social perspective 
and VOP. The social perspective at Stage 3 for example, is less aware of social systems and 
is more focused on relationships between two or more people, whereas at Stage 4 the 
individual differentiates the role of the social system from interpersonal relationships 
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  
Social Perspective Level and VOP define how the meaning of morally relevant content is 
constructed and exert an influence on how cognitive operations are organized to form stage 
structure. Here, content refers to the choice or action the individual chooses, the norm or 
general value guiding that choice, and the reasoning element that represents an underlying 
logic that provides a moral motive (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). These components of 
content, which can be seen in Table 2.2.2, intersect at a particular stage to represent a 
discrete moral judgment. 
The content analysis of individual’s responses to varied moral dilemmas, which includes 
classifying content into categories of norms and values, enables the trained researcher to 
make inferences about the use of cognitive operations and hence leads to the identification 
of the individual’s stage of moral development.   
Identifying a respondent’s stage score requires categorizing individual’s responses 
according to content and then addressing the question of structure. The first step involved 
in analyzing the content of a response to a moral dilemma is to determine which issue is 
being upheld by an individual; that is, which choice they make when faced with two 
conflicting issues. The second step is the identification and classification of norms and 
elements. Norms represent the moral value or object of concern the individual uses to 
justify their choice, and elements are the underlying logics that provide moral motives for 
actions.  One may argue for example, that a husband should steal (property issue) a life 
saving drug for his dying wife (life issue) because of the importance of their loving 
relationship (affiliation norm). When asked “why?” one could respond that “it is a 
husband’s role to protect his wife,” illustrating a duty element (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  
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Table 2.2.2: Kohlberg’s Categories of Moral Content 
The Elements 
 
  1. Modal Elements 
a. Obeying persons of Deity. Should get consent. 
b. Blaming (or Approving). Should be blamed for, disapproved of. 
c. Retribution (or Exoneration). Should get retribution against. 
d. Having a right (or having no right). 
e. Having a duty (or having no duty). 
2. Value Elements 
a. Egocentric Consequences: 
• Good reputation/Bad reputation. 
• Seeking reward/Avoiding punishment 
b. Utilitarian Consequences: 
• Good individual consequences/Bad individual consequences. 
• Good group consequences/Bad group consequences. 
c. Ideal Consequences: 
• Upholding character. 
• Upholding self-respect. 
• Serving social ideal or harmony. 
• Serving human dignity and autonomy. 
d. Fairness: 
• Balancing perspectives or role-taking. 
• Reciprocity or positive reward. 
• Maintaining equity and procedural fairness.  
• Maintaining social contracts or freely agreeing 
The Norms 
1. Life 
• Preservation 
• Quality/Quantity 
7. Laws 
 
2. Property 
 
8. Contract  
3. Truth 
 
9. Civil Rights  
4. Affiliation 
 
10. Religion 
5. Love/Sex 
 
11. Conscience  
6. Authority 12. Punishment 
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As stated above, the identification of the normative content in a moral judgment allows one 
to infer stage structure. For Kohlberg, structure means “general organizing principles or 
patterns of thought rather than specific moral beliefs” (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987 p.2). 
Kohlberg’s conception of structure is based on inferences derived from the content analysis 
of individual responses, as the structures to which Kohlberg refers are not tangible, but are 
rather inferred cognitive organizations of the moral operations defined above, held to 
generate a variety of different manifest responses. Special attention is paid to the structure 
rather than content because it is the structure that exhibits developmental regularity and 
generalizability within and across individuals (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  
 
The concept of structure implies that a consistent form of reasoning can be abstracted from 
the content of an individual’s varied responses to a variety of moral dilemmas (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987). However, differentiating the structure of moral judgment from the content 
(choice, norms, and elements of moral reasoning) used by individuals is not a simple task.   
Analyzing the content of moral judgments enables the researcher to discover what the 
individual is valuing (e.g. life, law, etc.), as well as determine the person’s stage of moral 
reasoning. Properly analyzing the content of moral judgments is important because the 
same norms and elements have different meaning when used at different stages of 
development (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). As an example, at Stage 3 the issue of life is 
related to an underlying principle that motivates one to help those in need. At Stage 5, 
however, the same issue of life is a  “principled” logic that leads one to value the right to 
life over the right to property (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). As the individual progresses from 
lower stages (Stage 1) toward higher stages (Stage 6) of moral reasoning, the structural 
organization of cognitive operations develops along with the individuals SPL and VOP 
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  
 
Although the study of moral development requires the distinction between content and 
structure, identification of particular aspects of moral reasoning can be used to study moral 
development apart from a strict concern with the issue of developmental progression.  As 
previously stated, we will not be assessing the stages of moral development due to time 
limitations and the extensive training required to analyze moral judgment interviews. The 
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current research, however, does not require an analysis based on moral stages as we intend 
to investigate how relativistic attitudes may be related to a different, but closely related 
dimension of moral reasoning.   
2.3 Functional Properties of Moral Reasoning (A/B Type) 
As noted above, the content of moral reasoning can be assessed separately from the stage 
score of moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1987) reasoned that there was a way to understand a 
dimension of moral reasoning that was “intermediate” between form and content, which is 
in a sense, simultaneously both form and content. These intermediate aspects of form and 
content (to be discussed below) were considered by him to be functional characteristics of a 
stage. By functional, Kohlberg was attempting to determine whether or not a “stage 
structure in use” was processing moral judgments in either a heteronomous or autonomous 
manner (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  
Originally a distinction Piaget used to distinguish a difference between stages, Kohlberg 
understood the differences between heteronomy and autonomy as being relevant to our 
understanding of “within” stage functioning. For Kohlberg, it was theoretically reasonable 
to argue that from Stages 2 through 51 it would be possible to discern heteronomous forms 
of reasoning at each stage; forms that manifest as “pre-constructed” logic in the responses 
to his dilemmas. For example, a respondent who states, “it is wrong to steal to save 
someone, because stealing is against the law,” would only be using an equality operation to 
simply re-assert a culturally sanctioned norm against stealing. Such reasoning avoids the 
use of other available operations at Stages 2 through 5 (equity, reciprocity, prescriptive 
role-taking etc.), which if used, would produce “actively reconstructed” autonomous 
judgments; judgments indicating a respondent’s attempt to produce more balanced, “fair” 
judgments. For example, a respondent who states, “while it is against the law to steal, an 
exception to this rule would be fair in this particular circumstance, because of the needs of 
the persons involved and because of the fact that society has laws that are so insensitive and 
should be held in contempt,” would illustrate the respondents use of an underlying equity 
logic as well as an implied use of sympathy, with the attempt to construct a fair judgment. 
                                                        
1
 Stage 1 can only be heteronomous and Stage 6 could only be autonomous.  
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For Kohlberg, this latter example demonstrates a more equilibrated use of stage structure. It 
should be noted that the “more equilibrated” use of a stage structure involves more than a 
simple parroting of culturally sanctioned norms, but instead indicates active reasoning on 
the part of the respondent. Such active reasoning in all cases requires that respondents 
utilize their stage specific understanding of VOP in order to reconstruct a pre-constructed, 
unreflective understanding of the stage specific SPL.   
 
One of the basic assumptions of Kohlberg’s theory is that the direction of moral 
development is toward greater equilibrium, or rather the increasingly coordinated use of all 
cognitive operations available to a stage of moral reasoning. Based on this notion, Kohlberg 
attempted to construct sub-stages of moral development, a move that stemmed from his 
concern with identifying when moral stages reach an equilibrated form. Kohlberg’s original 
intent was to use the distinction between heteronomous A-type and autonomous B-type 
reasoning as indicative of structural sub-stages, to be understood as relevant to his model 
from Stages 2 through Stage 5. Thus, for example, one would be able to distinguish 
between an individual who was at stage 2A or stage 2B, or at stage 4A or stage 4B of moral 
development. As a result, moral types (A-type/B-type) were originally conceptualized by 
Kohlberg as being general reflections of Piaget’s two stages of moral development: 
heteronomy and autonomy. Kohlberg, however, relinquished his conception of “sub-stage” 
research when evidence indicated that changes in the developmental patterns of A sub-stage 
and B sub-stage did not conform to his theory of stage progression. Recognizing the 
importance of distinguishing between heteronomous and autonomous forms of reasoning, 
Kohlberg and his colleagues nevertheless maintained research interest in investigating the 
A (heteronomous) and B (autonomous) distinction as functional properties of reasoning 
rather than structural sub-stages (Kohlberg et al., 1984; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  
 
As previously discussed, heteronomous moral reasoning corresponds to an orientation 
whereby the individual judges in a “pre-constructed” manner.  In contrast to this, 
autonomous moral reasoning is characterized by the ability to consider rules critically and 
in so doing derive a judgment of fairness (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  Accordingly, the moral 
judgments produced by B-type reasoning appear much less rigid (Kohlberg et al., 1984). 
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The criteria listed in Table 2.3.1 were adapted from Schrader et al., 1987, and are used to 
identify autonomous B-Type reasoning.  
 
Table 2.3.1: Kohlberg’s Criteria for B Type Reasoning 
1. Choice - An autonomous response is one that is consistent with a just and fair point 
of view at the post-conventional level. 
2. Hierarchy - Autonomous judgments reflect a clear hierarchy of moral values. For 
example, life will be regarded as more important than the law. 
3. Intrinsicality – A statement that values people as ends in themselves, rather than 
means to an end.   
4. Prescriptivity - Evidence of a sense of moral duty that one feels as an inner 
compulsion, not because of authority. 
5. Universality – Expressing the idea that any and everyone in a similar situation 
should make the same moral judgments. 
6. Freedom - Autonomous judgments are those made without reference to the need to 
conform to external parameters, such as authority or the law. 
7. Mutual Respect – The claim that individuals should treat others’ as they would wish 
to be treated. Expressions show a concern for cooperation among equals.   
8. Reversibility – Responses indicate an attempt to balance perspectives or evidence of 
reciprocal role taking.  
9. Constructivism - An individual using autonomous reasoning will recognize that 
rules and laws are humanly constructed guidelines and are therefore flexible and 
adaptable to specific situation.  
 
Kohlberg’s global Moral Type Measure is oriented toward identifying autonomous B-type 
reasoning and treats heteronomous A-type reasoning as being “not B-type reasoning” 
(Pakvis, 1995).  Moral reasoning is designated as B-type when individual’s judgments have 
endorsed certain moral values and demonstrated competence with the use of various 
cognitive operations considered by Kohlberg (1984) as fundamental to post-conventional 
moral reasoning.  
This move from moral “sub-stage” to “moral type” represents a retreat from structural 
developmental analysis, but not from developmental analysis.  Other research has shown 
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for instance, that B type reasoning is associated with other characteristics of persons in 
ways that suggest a more adequate and normatively defensible change in human 
development (Levine, Pakvis & Higgins, 2000; Levine, Jakubowski & Cote, 1992).  
 
Based on the assumption that the stage scores of our university sample would likely lie 
between Stages 2 and 4 of moral development (Colby et al., 1983,1987; Jakubowski, 1989; 
Kohlberg et al., 1984; Levine, 1992; Pakvis, 1995; Snarey et al., 1983; Walker et al., 1982, 
1989, 1991) we intend to score participants’ type of moral reasoning in three different 
ways: with a global categorization of individual’s responses according to the nine criteria 
listed in Table 2.3.1 (a technique used by Kohlberg et al. 1984, to be described in the 
following methods section); by calculating an overall total for B element use; and by 
tracking the frequency of “specific B Element” use, where the use of specific elements of 
B-Type reasoning are conceptualized as single units of data that combine to form a pattern 
of usage that is characteristic of one’s moral reasoning profile. The investigation of the 
relationship between the functional use of moral reasoning and relativism will use these 
three scoring methods.  
2.4 Relativism  
The term ethical relativism can be used to refer to any one of several distinct positions a 
person may take when arguing against the universality of morals. Descriptive relativism for 
instance, is the belief that all moral values are relative to the culture in which they are 
accepted. As a result, there are no moral norms common to all societies or cultures, as each 
society has their own view of what is right and wrong and these views differ from one 
society to the next (Levy, 2003; Rachels, 2007).  Another perspective is normative 
relativism, which makes a normative claim by denying the universal validity of moral rules. 
Accordingly, anyone who uses the norms of one society as the basis for judging the 
character or conduct of persons in another society is making an illogical claim (Rachels, 
2007).  
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Kohlberg argues that a relativistic attitude is a necessary, although temporary pre-condition, 
for movement to Stage 5 (post-conventional) moral development.  For him, relativism 
refers to a questioning of the validity of one’s ability to make moral judgments about or for 
others and visa versa. Additionally, it is associated with the belief that there are no 
universally valid moral standards or rules of conduct. Therefore, for Kohlberg relativism is 
a position that causes the individual to question their ability to make normative judgments 
such as “it is always wrong to hurt someone” (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Kohlberg’s theory 
of moral development, however, deals specifically with the normative judgments made in 
response to moral dilemmas. As a result, we have adopted the following definition of 
relativism and relativistic attitude. For our purposes, relativistic attitudes refer to three 
distinct modes of thinking which hold 1) that people believe there are no universally valid 
moral points of view; 2) that what is morally right is dependent on context; and 3) that 
one’s own moral judgments may be different from those of other individuals and that these 
views cannot be claimed to be better or worse than those of others.   
 
Let us recall that for Kohlberg, some form of relativism is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for movement to Stage 5 of moral development, as it stimulates a 
disequilibration, or transition, from conventional to post-conventional moral reasoning 
(Kohlberg et al., 1984).  Following Kohlberg’s logic, when sensed, relativism may 
disequilibrate Stage 4 reasoning. When not sensed however, relativism may remain a strong 
attitude that inhibits further moral development. We pose the following question for the 
present research: “does the tension that relativism creates exist throughout moral 
development?” Kohlberg focuses upon a “transitional relativism” that, in the developmental 
sense, takes place between Stages 4 and 5, where one’s relativistic attitudes may prevent 
movement to Stage 5 due to the individual’s doubts that morality should be prescribed to all 
others, including oneself (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  Kohlberg does not however, investigate 
the role of relativism throughout the entire stage model. We suggest that relativism appears 
and plays a role at earlier stages of Kohlberg’s model as a stable attitude/position that 
interacts with B-type reasoning. There is reason to expect that a relationship between 
relativistic attitudes and B-type reasoning does exist at earlier stages, which could imply an 
onset of stage dis-equilibration. The scoring methods mentioned above (and discussed in 
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more detail in the Methods section) will allow us to explore relativism’s possible link to 
moral reasoning and its elements. 
 
Although relativism may inhibit claims about the existence of universally valid moral 
standards, it may lead to an awareness of, or rather an increased sensitivity to, the multiple 
points of view implicated in a dilemma.  This increased sensitivity to the points of view of 
others is linked to an awareness on the part of a respondent of the relevance of their VOP, 
which we suggest produces a cognitive disposition to utilize B elements and B-type 
reasoning.  
 
2.5 Summary  
 
The main intent of this research project will be to show that global scores of B-type 
reasoning and scores of total B element use are positively associated with one’s relativistic 
attitudes. More specifically, we expect that relativism scores will be positively associated 
with the use of the following specific B-type elements: intrinsicality, autonomy/freedom, 
mutual respect, and reversibility (See Table 2.3.1). This expectation is based on the fact that 
the use of these B-type elements implies an awareness on the part of respondents of the 
existence, and perhaps relevance of, the points of view/needs of several actors in a moral 
dilemma: an awareness that is compatible with a relativistic attitude. Whether or not 
relativism scores are positively associated with the B-type elements of hierarchy, 
prescriptivity, and constructivism is not clear. Furthermore, we expect that relativism scores 
will be inversely related to use of the universality element, as this element represents a 
respondent’s belief that judgments should be considered correct for all persons, a view that 
would contradict a relativistic attitude.  
In addition to the above, we also predict the following concerning the other two measures 
of B-type reasoning: that global B-type scores, scores of total B-type element use, and 
scores of relativism will be positively associated with scores on the Triadic Measure of 
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Equity Sensitivity2 (TMES) (essentially a measure of the ability to balance perspectives), 
the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ), and a measure of open-mindedness (Rokeach). 
Relatively high degrees of open-mindedness, sensitivity to issues of fairness and balancing 
perspectives, and the disposition to be empathetic, are all factors that imply a respondent’s 
cognitive disposition to be aware of the existence and possible relevance of the point of 
view of others in a given situation. Accordingly, measures of these factors should be 
positively associated with one another, and with relativistic attitudes. While this research is 
concerned with demonstrating such associations, it is also concerned with illustrating 
positive associations of these three dispositions with the two measures of B-type reasoning. 
If these latter associations are observed this would imply a respondent’s ability to use these 
dispositions in the domain of prescriptive reasoning. The following is a list of the 
hypotheses: 
1. Global scores of B-type moral reasoning and scores of total B element use will be 
positively associated with one’s relativistic attitudes.  
2. The B-type elements intrinsicality, autonomy, mutual respect, and reversibility will 
be positively associated with one’s relativistic attitudes. 
3. The B-type element, universality, will be inversely related to relativistic attitude.  
4. Global scores of B-type moral reasoning and scores of total B element use will be 
positively associated with equity. 
5. Global scores of B-type moral reasoning and scores of total B element use will be 
positively associated with empathy. 
6. Global scores of B-type moral reasoning and scores of total B element use will be 
positively associated with open-mindedness. 
7. Scores of relativism will be positively associated with equity, empathy, and open-
mindedness.  
8. The measures of equity, empathy, and open-mindedness will be positively 
associated.  
It must be emphasized that this thesis is exploratory in nature. The research conducted was 
stimulated by the interest in determining the positive role that relativistic attitudes might 
play in moral reasoning and therefore in the process of moral development. If evidence is 
                                                        
2 The TMES is not a direct measure of the use of the equity operation that Kohlberg 
implicates as relevant to his definition of stage structure.  
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observed that is consistent with the above hypotheses, grounds will have been provided for 
future longitudinal research that will allow researchers to deal more clearly with the 
developmental impact of relativistic attitudes. In addition, such research will likely have 
implications for educational practice, as well as for critical sociological inquiry into the 
definition and role of the “agentic actor” (Giddens, Habermas, Bourdieu).  
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Chapter 3 
3 Methods 
3.1 Subjects 
The participants in the present study were students attending Western University 
(UWO) in London, Ontario. Of the 144 approached for the study, 95 completed the survey 
in its entirety. Of the 95 participants there were 55 female students and 40 male students. 
Year of academic study ranged from first year to fourth year (See Table 3.1.1). Age of 
participants ranged from 17 to 30; however, the majority of the sample was between the 
ages of 17 and 20 (See Table 3.1.2).  
Table 3.1.1: Year of Study (n = 95) 
 Frequency Percent 
First Year 23 24.2 
Second Year 
Third Year 
Fourth Year 
25 
21 
26 
26.3 
22.1 
27.4 
 
Table 3.1.2: Age (n = 95) 
Age Frequency Percent 
17-20 59 62.1 
21-24 
25-28 
29+ 
31 
4 
1 
32.6 
4.2 
1.1 
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3.1.2 Procedure  
The majority of participants were solicited via posters that were hung on message boards 
around the University Social Science building. Additional methods of recruitment included 
two mass email notifications sent to the faculties of Social Science and Arts, as well as 
visits to selected classes of students enrolled in Sociology courses.  
Participants were asked to complete an online survey that contained a battery of tests 
designed to measure their type of moral reasoning, relativistic attitudes, ability to take the 
perspective of others, ability to balance perspectives, and finally their degree of open-
mindedness.  The Social Science and Network Data Service (SSNDS) at UWO was the 
online host for the survey. This site encrypts all information to ensure confidentiality and 
anonymity and is certified as being secure. Using a link provided by SSNDS, participants 
were directed to the secure site to complete the questionnaire. Participants read the letter of 
information and had the opportunity to ask any questions prior to the completion of the 
online questionnaire. All surveys had the same set of instructions for each section and 
participants were asked to read each set carefully before beginning. The survey took 
approximately 30 minutes to complete, and once finished participants were compensated 
five dollars for their time.  
Ethics approval for use with human participants was obtained on September 20th, 2011 
from the Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (Review Number: 18314S).  
3.2 Measures 
The variables selected for analyses were chosen based on the theoretical themes discussed 
in the previous chapter. The Kohlberg global scores of B-type reasoning and scores of B 
element reasoning are considered the dependent variables in this study, while relativistic 
attitude is designated as the key independent variable. Additional independent variables 
include balancing perspectives, perspective taking, and open-mindedness. A scale designed 
to assess respondents’ level of social desirability bias was also employed.  
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3.2.1 Lawrence Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview 
Participants were asked to complete a modified version of Kohlberg’s moral judgment 
interview. The moral judgment interview (MJI) was designed to elicit a subject's 
construction of moral reasoning, their assertions about right and wrong, and the way these 
assertions are used to make and justify moral decisions (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987; cited in 
Elm & Weber, 1994).  
The MJI uses nine hypothetical moral dilemmas that focus on a number of different moral 
and ethical issues in order to stimulate a respondent’s moral reasoning. Traditionally, the 
Kohlberg measure is administered as an oral interview in which the researcher has the 
ability to interact with the participant and ask nine to twelve probe questions designed to 
elicit elaboration and clarification of the subject’s moral judgments. For the present study 
however, an adapted version of the MJI was given in a written format in which participants 
were asked to read three different stories that each depict a moral dilemma and then answer 
open-ended probe questions designed to elicit elaboration of the reasons for their moral 
judgment.  
The complete MJI is composed of three forms: A, B, and C, each of which contains three 
different moral dilemmas. In the current study, modified dilemmas from form A (Heinz 
Dilemma, Joe Dilemma) and form C (Bob and Karl Dilemma) were used (Appendix A). 
Type of Moral Reasoning (Global Score) 
As discussed previously, Kohlberg et al. (1987) developed a “moral type” measure of moral 
reasoning that assesses the form, or structure, as well as the content of a moral judgment. In 
order to assess a person’s moral type, the researcher must analyze whether a subject’s 
response demonstrates an appropriate degree of “moral autonomy.” When determining type 
of moral reasoning, emphasis is placed on whether a subject’s responses demonstrate 
adequate levels of autonomy, regardless of their stage in moral development (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987).  Responses are scored as being either Pass, Fail, or Absent. The following 
nine criteria (adapted from Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) are used to assess whether or not 
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responses are autonomous B-type moral judgments, or “not B-type” moral judgments (i.e. 
heteronomous).  
1. Choice - An autonomous response is one that is consistent with a just and fair point 
of view at the post-conventional level. 
2. Hierarchy - Autonomous judgments reflect a clear hierarchy of moral values. For 
example, life will be regarded as more important than the law. 
3. Intrinsicality – A statement that values people as ends in themselves, rather than 
means to an end.   
4. Prescriptivity - Evidence of a sense of moral duty that one feels as an inner 
compulsion, not because of authority. 
5. Universality – Expressing the idea that any and everyone in a similar situation 
should make the same moral judgments. 
6. Autonomy - Autonomous judgments are those made without reference to the need 
to conform to external parameters, such as authority or the law. 
7. Mutual Respect – The claim that individuals should treat others as they would wish 
to be treated. Expressions show a concern for cooperation among equals.   
8. Reversibility – Responses indicate an attempt to balance perspectives or evidence of 
reciprocal role taking.  
9. Constructivism - An individual using autonomous reasoning will recognize that 
rules and laws are humanly constructed guidelines and are therefore flexible and 
adaptable to specific situation.  
 
For each dilemma in the MJI several of the criteria listed above are designated as being 
“critical.” The critical criteria refer to empirically consistent responses that are considered 
to be crucial indicators of B-type reasoning. The scorer relies upon matches to the critical 
criteria (provided in the scoring manual), which are designated with an asterisk (*), to 
determine if a response to a probe question is a pass, a fail, or absent (Appendix C) (Colby 
& Kohlberg, 1987). In order for a subject’s responses to be considered B-type none of the 
critical criteria can be coded as a fail, and at least two of the critical criteria must receive a 
“pass.” For example, for Dilemma-I, the critical criteria are Choice, Hierarchy, 
Prescriptivity, and Universality. Once all the criteria are scored for each of the probe 
questions the overall score of the dilemma is calculated. A fail on any of the critical criteria, 
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or a fail on two or more of any of the criteria, earns the dilemma an overall categorization 
of A-type (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). A dilemma cannot be given a designation score if 
there is an equal number of pass and fail responses coded for the dilemma. Dilemma scores 
are used to create a “global score” that is considered to be the subject’s overall type. In 
order for a participant to be coded as a B-type, two out of the three dilemmas used must 
receive an overall score of B (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).  
B-Element Score 
A strategy for scoring B Element use was also developed for use in the present study. 
Kohlberg’s global measure (1984) is the basis for making inferences regarding overall 
qualities of a respondent’s moral reasoning: whether it is on average heteronomous or 
autonomous. The focus of B Element scoring is more “micro” in nature. By adopting a B 
Element scoring strategy the intent is to utilize a more sensitive measure for detecting the 
successful use of specific autonomous dimensions of moral reasoning.  Although a 
subject’s response may not meet the requirements necessary to be considered B-type, as 
defined by the Kohlbergian method, it is still the case that participants may display 
responses that exhibit the use of B Element reasoning. In other words, while the specified 
critical criteria may not be met for a dilemma to be scored B-type, participants may still 
give responses that indicate the successful use of B Elements.  
The results of scoring for B Element cannot allow a researcher to make inferences 
regarding quality of stage structure, but they can provide evidence of the use of 
autonomous elements, providing evidence of possible moral developmental potential. 
Therefore, subjects were also designated a score for “total B element use.” Scores were 
calculated by summing the number of B Elements passed on each dilemma. This generated 
a total score out of 21, which was calculated by adding the three dilemma scores together.  
In addition to Total B Element Use, the frequency with which B-type elements were used 
was also calculated. These criteria were included as a separate measure of B Element use 
based on the notion that the frequency with which an element of B-type moral reasoning 
was used may be related to the independent variables. Scores for “frequency of specific B-
type element use” was calculated by summing all the utterances that passed as B-type for 
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each element on a dilemma. For example, if the B-type element “hierarchy” was passed on 
dilemma one three times, and once on dilemma two and three the respondent received a 
score of 5 for the hierarchy element. There was no limit for how many times a participant 
could pass a specific element.  
In the present study, inter-rater reliability for the A/B-type measure was calculated by re-
scoring a random sample of twenty cases. The sample of twenty cases was re-scored by a 
PhD student whose research also utilized the Kohlbergian dilemmas in order to derive 
global scores of moral reasoning and total B element use. Inter-rater reliability was 85%.  
3.2.2 The Triadic Measure of Equity Sensitivity  
Respondents were instructed to answer statements about what they would like their 
relationships with other persons to be like.  The Triadic Measure of Equity Sensitivity 
(TMES), developed by Clark et al. (2010), was used in the current research as a measure of 
participant’s ability to balance the perspective of others. The measure consists of five 
statements, each of which has a “benevolent response”, an “entitled response”, and a 
“balanced response.” For example, the statement “When I interact with others it would be 
most important for me to:” is followed by three possible responses including “Get 
something from them,” representing an entitled equity type, “Give something to them,” 
which indicates a benevolent equity type, and “Give as much to them as I get from them,” 
representing an equity-balanced equity type.  
Respondents are asked to assign a majority of points (up to ten) to one of these three 
categories based on their preference for giving, getting, or seeking balance in exchange 
situations. The researcher is then able to identify respondents as being benevolent, equity-
balanced, entitled, or indifferent, by summing the points allotted to each category (Clark et 
al., 2010).  The category with the most points is designated as that person’s primary equity-
type. In instances when the respondent is designated as “indifferent” however, there is no 
marked preference for any of the three possible responses since subject’s express a lack of 
preference by allocating points relatively equally across the three response types (Clark et 
al., 2010).  
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This variable is presented as a categorical measure, indicating whether individuals are 
benevolent (3), equity-balanced (2), entitled (1), or indifferent (0). The TMES was adapted 
from the Equity Sensitivity Instrument developed by Huseman et al. (1985), whose research 
reports a coefficient alpha of 0.83 for the ESI. Additionally, Miles et al. (1989) report a 
test-retest reliability of 0.80.  
For the purpose of the current study only the equity-balanced and benevolent categories 
were included since it is these two categories, which were combined to create the equity 
variable, understood as a measure of a pro-social orientation toward others that will be 
positively associated with relativism as well as with B-type moral reasoning measures.  
3.2.3 The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire 
The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ) was developed by Spreng et al., (2009). This 
item is a self-report measure designed to gauge one’s level of empathy. Empathy is an 
important component of social cognition that contributes to one’s ability to understand and 
respond to others’ emotions (Spreng et al., 2009). The ability to empathize with others 
involves an imaginative apprehension of another’s emotional state and is strongly linked to 
perspective taking, which involves the apprehension of another’s thoughts and feelings 
through situational cues (Spreng et al., 2009).  
The TEQ was used in the present study to determine respondents’ ability to take the 
perspective of others. Participants were asked to read a list of statements and rate how 
frequently they felt or acted in the manner described. For example, statements such as 
“When someone else is feeling excited, I tend to get exited too,” or “I can tell when others 
are sad even when they do not say anything,” encompass a range of attributes associated 
with perspective taking and empathy (Spreng et al., 2009)  
The TEQ contains 16 items (Appendix C) that are scored using a 4-point Likert scale that 
ranges from never (0) to always (4). Items 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15 are reverse scored. 
The scores are summed to derive the subject’s total score. Construct validity of this item is 
demonstrated through associations with self-report measures of interpersonal sensitivity as 
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well as its internal consistency (α = .85) and test-retest reliability (r = .81, p < .001) 
(Spreng et al., 2009).   
3.2.4 The Ethics Position Questionnaire 
The strength of relativistic attitude of a respondent was measured using the Ethics Position 
Questionnaire (EPQ) (Forsyth, 1980); a scale designed to assess an individual’s moral 
philosophy.  
The EPQ asks individuals to indicate their acceptance of items that vary in terms of 
relativism and idealism. Forsyth (1992) holds that individuals who are swayed by 
contextual information are relativists, as they feel that right decisions are dependent on the 
context of the situation and on the people involved.  In contrast to relativism, there is the 
philosophical dimension of idealism. Proponents of this position tend to believe that the 
right action is always the one that is in line with universal moral principles, norms, or laws, 
regardless of the context (Forsyth, 1992).  
The EPQ consists of two 10-item scales that measure idealism and relativism separately 
(Forsyth, 1980). Items are scored along a 9-point Likert scale that ranges from “completely 
disagree” (1) to “completely agree” (9). Participant’s scores on each sub-scale are summed 
and can range from 10 to 90. For the purpose of the present study, however, the EPQ was 
used only to evaluate participant’s level of relativism, as idealism was not considered 
relevant to the current investigation. Using this one scale should not interfere with the 
validity of the scale as the two sub-scales were found to be orthogonal (Davis et al., 2001).  
The idealism and relativism scales exhibit moderately high internal consistency, indicating 
that these scales are reliable (.87, .85 respectively) (Davis et al., 2001).  
Slight revisions were made to the wording of items 11, 14, 17, 19, and 20 of the relativism 
scale to make them more applicable and comprehensive to the sample population 
(Appendix D).  
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3.2.5 Dogmatism Scale  
Participants were asked to complete the short form of Rokeach’s Dogmatism Scale (1954). 
This measure was included to measure individual differences in openness and closedness of 
belief systems.  
Dogmatism is defined by Rokeach (1960) as “(a) a relatively closed cognitive organization 
of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, (b) organized around a central set of beliefs about 
absolute authority which, in turn, (c) provides a framework for patterns of intolerance and 
qualified tolerance toward others” (Rokeach, 1954: p. 195). In contrast, open-mindedness is 
defined as the cognitive ability to “receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information” 
without being influenced by internal irrelevant pressures such as habits, beliefs, perceptual 
cues, and ego needs, or irrelevant external pressures such as authority, social and 
institutional norms, or cultural norms (Rokeach, 1960: p. 57).  
The short form dogmatism scale used in this study contains 20 items. Participants are asked 
to state how strongly they agree or disagree with each statement based on a 6-point Likert-
scale ranging from “agree a little” to “disagree very much.” The total score is the sum of 
scores obtained on all items of the measure (Appendix E). This scale has been shown to 
have satisfactory statistical properties for a half-length edition, as shown by the reliability 
coefficient of .79 (Troldahl & Powell, 1965).  
3.2.6 Social Desirability Scale 
Finally, participants were asked to complete the Social Desirability Scale (SDS), developed 
by Crowne and Marlowe (1960).  The measure consists of 33 “True” or “False” questions. 
Scores can range from 0-to-33, with higher scores (20-to-33) indicating a heightened 
concern with social desirability (Appendix F).   
The SDS was included in the present study in an attempt to control for the tendency of 
respondents to answer questions in a manner that may be viewed favorably by others. This 
tendency is referred to as the social desirability bias, which is often an issue for self-report 
measures. The key assumption is that respondents who answer in a socially desirable 
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manner on the SDS are also responding desirably to all self-reports throughout the study. It 
can take the form of over-reporting good behavior or under-reporting bad behavior 
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  
One may assume, for example, that individuals responding to the moral dilemmas presented 
in this study (Appendix A) could simply be presenting what they consider to be the most 
morally desirable position. Colby & Kohlberg (1987) argue, however, that this bias does 
not compromise the validity of the MJI, as the coding criteria attempt to measure the most 
advanced level of reasoning the individual is capable of. As a result, this prohibits 
respondent’s attempts to misrepresent their moral reasoning as better than it is (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987).  
Several studies have shown that the internal consistency of the SDS is adequate. For 
instance, Nordhom (1974) found a coefficient of .73, and Holden and Fekken (1989) report 
a coefficient of .78. Test-retest reliability has also been established for this measure. 
According to one study by Crino et al. (1983), for example, test-retest reliability was .86. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Analyses 
The following analyses address the exploratory research hypotheses stated in Chapter 2. 
The statistical package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 19, was used to analyze the 
data. The results are presented below as follows: first, section 4.1 presents sample 
characteristics. Section 4.2 discusses the analyses conducted to assess the possibility of 
social desirability bias in the sample. Section 4.3 reports the associations between 
relativism and the other independent variables of equity, empathy, and open-mindedness. 
Possible associations among the independent variables were investigated using Pearson 
correlation analyses. Section 4.4 examines the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variables. First, the association between global B-type score of 
moral reasoning and the independent variables was investigated using a test of mean 
differences (t-tests). Next, the relationship between total B element use and the independent 
variables was explored. The statistical procedures used to investigate these relationships 
were Pearson correlation analyses. Finally, the association between the frequency of 
specific B-type element use and relativism was computed using Pearson correlation 
analyses. Section 4.5 presents the results of various regression models computed to 
estimate associations between the independent variables and the dependent variables.  
4.1 Sample Characteristics  
Field of academic study included Arts & Humanities, Business, Health Sciences, Sciences, 
and Social Science. The preponderance of subjects indicated their discipline as Social 
Science (See Table 4.1.1). Of the 95 participants, 48 (50.5%) were scored as global B-type 
moral reasoners, while the remaining subjects, 47 (49.5%) were scored as A-type.  
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Table 4.1.1: Field of Study (n = 95) 
 Frequency Percent 
Arts/Humanities 4 4.2 
Business 
Health Science 
Science 
Social Science 
21 
10 
14 
46 
22.1 
10.5 
14.7 
48.4 
 
4.2 Social Desirability Bias 
The Social Desirability Scale (SDS) was included in the present study in order to assess the 
tendency of respondents to answer questions in a manner that may be viewed favorably by 
others. A Pearson correlation analysis was computed to determine if scores on any of the 
independent variables were significantly related to social desirability. The analysis 
indicated that none of the independent measures were significantly associated with social 
desirability bias (See Table 4.2.1).  
Table 4.2.1: Correlation Matrix for Social Desirability & Independent Variables (n = 
95) 
Independent Variables 
 
Social Desirability (SDS) 
Relativism (EPQ) .003 
(.975) 
 
Equity  
 
.023 
(.824) 
 
Empathy (TEQ) 
 
.183 
(.076) 
 
Open-mindedness (DS) 
 
.137 
(.185) 
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, **p < .01 
p-values appear in parentheses below the correlations 
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4.3 Associations among the Independent Variables  
It was hypothesized that scores on the relativism measure would be positively associated 
with measures of equity, empathy, and open-mindedness based on the notion that relatively 
high degrees of open-mindedness, sensitivity to issues of fairness, and the disposition to be 
empathetic, are all factors that positively impact a respondent’s cognitive disposition to be 
aware of the existence and possible relevance of the point of view of others in a given 
situation.   
The Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) was used to measure respondent’s relativistic 
attitudes. Equity was measured using the Triadic Measure of Equity Sensitivity (TMES), 
from here on referred to as the “equity” variable. As stated in Chapter 3, the equity variable 
was comprised of a summed score from the benevolent and equity-balanced categories. 
Participant’s level of empathy was measured using the Toronto Empathy Questionnaire 
(TEQ), and level of open-mindedness was measured using the Short Form Dogmatism 
Scale (DS).  
The inter-correlation matrix of all the independent variables is presented in Table 4.3.1. The 
Pearson correlations analysis presented in this table indicated that scores on the equity 
variable, the TEQ and the DS were not significantly related to relativism.  
The idea that high degrees of open-mindedness, issues of fairness and balancing 
perspectives, and the disposition to be empathetic, are all factors that contribute to a 
cognitive disposition that acknowledges the existence and relevance of others’ points of 
view in a given situation, led to the expectation that these factors (equity, empathy, and 
open-mindedness) would be positively associated with one another. As can be observed in 
Table 4.3.1, these expectations were realized as indicated by the findings of significant 
associations among equity and empathy, as well as empathy and open-mindedness.  
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Table 4.3.1: Correlation Matrix for Relativism & the Independent Variables (n = 95) 
Independent 
Variables 
Relativism 
(EPQ) 
Equity Empathy 
(TEQ) 
Open-
mindedness 
(DS) 
Relativism 1    
Equity  -.166 
(.108) 
1   
 
Empathy (TEQ) 
 
-.139 
(.178) 
 
.279** 
(.006) 
 
1 
 
 
Open-mindedness 
(DS) 
 
.150 
(.148) 
 
.187 
(.070) 
 
.371** 
(.000) 
 
1 
     
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, **p < .01 
p-values appear in parentheses below the correlations 
 
 4.4 Associations among the Independent Variables and the 
Dependent Variables 
It will be recalled that global B-type scores of moral reasoning and scores of total B 
element use were hypothesized to be positively associated with all of the independent 
variables. Additionally, it was hypothesized that the frequency of specific B-type element 
use would be related to relativism. More specifically, it was hypothesized that the 
frequency of use of intrinsicality, autonomy, mutual respect, and reversibility, would be 
positively associated with relativism since these B-type elements imply an awareness on the 
part of respondents of the existence, and perhaps relevance, of the points of view of several 
actors in a moral dilemma. Whether or not relativism scores would be positively associated 
with the B-type elements of hierarchy, prescriptivity, and constructivism was not clear, as 
there was no theoretical basis for making predictions in this instance. Finally, it was 
hypothesized that relativism would be inversely related to use of the universality element, 
as this element represents a respondent’s belief that judgments should be considered correct 
for all persons, a view that would contradict a relativistic attitude.  
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Global B-type Score of Moral Reasoning 
The first relationship investigated was between participant’s global B-type scores of moral 
reasoning and the independent variables. Mean scores for B-type reasoners on the EPQ, 
equity, the TEQ, and the DS were compared with those for A-type reasoners using t-tests.  
Contrary to expectation, the results of the analysis revealed that those who received a 
global score of B-type did not differ significantly from those who received a global score of 
A-type on any of the independent measures (See Table 4.4.1).  
Table 4.4.1: Independent Variable means for Global Score of Moral Reasoning (n = 
95) 
 Global Score   
Independent 
Variables  
B-type             A-type 
(n=48)            (n=47) 
t df  p 
Relativism (EPQ) 31.77              31.04 .542 93 .743 
 (.844)             (.838)   
    
Equity  32.75               32.23 
(2.06)              (2.27) 
-.168 93 .469 
    
Empathy (TEQ) 46.48               45.94 
(1.03)               (1.10) 
.720 93 .438 
    
Open-mindedness 
(DS) 
73.88                71.81 
(1.18)               (1.63) 
.399 93 .287 
Note: standard error of the mean appears in parentheses below the means 
 
Total B Element Use 
Next, the relationship between total B element use and the independent variables was 
investigated. It was hypothesized that the independent variables in the current study would 
be positively associated with participant’s total B element use. As previously stated, total B 
element use refers to the combined total of B elements passed on all three of the dilemmas 
used in the present study. Scores for this variable could range from 0-21. For instance, a 
subject who utilized the elements of autonomy and mutual respect on dilemma one and 
two, and hierarchy and intrinsicality on dilemma three, would receive a score of 6.  
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Pearson correlation analyses were computed to determine which variables were 
significantly associated with total B element use. The results of the analysis indicated that 
none of the relationships reached a level of statistical significance (See Table 4.4.2).  
Table 4.4.2: Correlation Matrix for Total B Element Use & the Independent Variables 
(n = 95) 
Independent Variables  
 
Total B Element Use 
Relativism (EPQ) .167 
(.105) 
 
Equity  
 
.099 
(.339) 
 
Empathy (TEQ) 
 
.056 
(.588) 
 
Open-mindedness (DS) 
 
.128 
(.216) 
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, **p < .01 
p-values appear in parentheses below the correlations 
 
Frequency of Specific B-type Element Use 
Finally, the associations between the frequency of specific B-type element use and 
relativism were explored. Pearson correlation analyses were performed and the results of 
the analyses revealed no statistically significant relationships between relativism and the 
frequency of specific B-type element use (See Table 4.4.3).   
4.5 Variables Predicting B-type Reasoning  
To further examine the associations among the independent variables and the dependent 
variables, various regression analyses were undertaken.  
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Table 4.4.3: Correlation Matrix for Relativism & Frequency of B-type Element Use (n 
= 95) 
B-type Element 
 
Relativism (EPQ) 
Intrinsicality  -.150 
(.147) 
Autonomy  
-.059 
(.568) 
 
Mutual Respect 
 
-.006 
(.950) 
 
Reversability  
 
.035 
(.739) 
 
Hierarchy  
 
-.055 
(.596) 
 
Prescriptivity 
 
.177 
(.086) 
 
Constructivism  
 
.123 
(.223) 
 
Universality 
 
-.081 
(.435) 
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, ** p < .01 
p-value appears in parentheses below the correlations 
 
Global B-type Score of Moral Reasoning 
First, binomial logistic regressions were performed to investigate the relationships between 
global B-type score of moral reasoning and the independent variables. The results of the 
analyses revealed that none of the independent variables significantly predicted global 
scores of moral reasoning (See Table 4.5.1).  
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Table 4.5.1: Binomial Logistic Regressions for Variables Predicting Global Score 
of Moral Reasoning (n = 95) 
 
Global  Scores 
 
Independent 
Variables 
B SE p 
Relativism (EPQ) 
 
.022 .036 .538 
Equity 
 
.002 .014 .865 
Empathy (TEQ) 
 
.010 .028 .717 
Open-mindedness 
(DS) 
.015 .018 .395 
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Total B Element Use 
Second, a multiple regression analysis was computed for total B element use. The results of 
the analysis revealed no statistically significant effects of the independent variables on total 
B element use (See Table 4.5.2).  
Table 4.5.2: Multiple Regression for Variables Predicting Total B Element Use  
(n = 95) 
 
Total B Element Use 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
B SE p 
 
Relativism (EPQ) 
 
.062 
 
.031 
 
.071 
 
Equity 
 
.012 
 
.013 
 
.325 
 
Empathy (TEQ) 
 
.001 
 
.027 
 
.969 
 
Open-mindedness 
(DS) 
 
.020 
 
.016 
 
.219 
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Frequency of Specific B-type Element Use 
Finally, simple linear regression analyses were computed to predict the variation in 
frequency of specific B-type element use based on participant’s relativism scores. The 
results of the analysis indicated that none of the B-type elements were significantly 
associated with relativism (See Table 4.5.3). Based on the findings of the linear regression, 
it was suspected that the other independent variables might be suppressing the effect of 
relativism on the frequency of specific B-type element use. For this reason, a multiple 
regression analysis was computed. The results of the analysis revealed no significant effect 
of any of the independent variables and the frequency with which the specific B-type 
elements were used (See Table 4.5.4).  
Table 4.5.3: Linear Regression for Relativism & Frequency of B-type Element Use (n = 
95) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
B-type Element 
 
B SE p 
Intrinsicality -.022 .015 .147 
Autonomy -.007 .013 .568 
Mutual Respect -.001 .014 .950 
Reversability .004 .013 .739 
Hierarchy -.011 .021 .596 
Prescriptivity .025 .015 .086 
Constructivism .010 .008 .233 
Universality -.009 .011 .435 
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Table 4.5.4: Multiple Regression for Variables Predicting Frequency of Specific B-type 
Element Use (n = 95) 
 
 Relativism (EPQ) Equity Empathy (TEQ) Open-mindedness 
(DS) 
B-type 
Element 
B SE p B SE p B SE p B SE p 
Intrinsicality -.019 .015 .206 -.003 .006 .666 .011 .013 .395 .004 .008 .582 
Autonomy -.007 .013 .605 .000 .005 .976 -.011 .011 .355 .007 .007 .284 
MutualRespect .003 .014 .854 .008 .006 .137 .013 .012 .293 -.008 .007 .287 
Reversability .004 .013 .763 .007 .005 .203 -.017 .011 .132 -.001 .007 .930 
Hierarchy -.003 .021 .876 -.002 .008 .833 .011 .018 .525 .021 .011 .053 
Prescriptivity .026 .015 .084 .010 .006 .086 -.013 .013 .304 -.005 .008 .534 
Constructivism .011 .009 .219 -.005 .003 .117 .006 .007 .432 .006 .004 .197 
Universality -.004 .011 .741 .006 .005 .215 .010 .011 .328 .003 .006 .628 
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
4.6 Summary 
Given the above results, further “threshold” analyses were conducted in order to further 
explore the possible effects of equity, empathy, and open-mindedness. Each of these 
variables was divided into categories of high and low, in which participants who scored in 
the upper 20% of the three variables were categorized as high and the remaining 
participants were categorized as low. The upper 20% were given the label of high because 
these respondents were decidedly above the mean of the rest of the sample. It was expected 
that for these individuals the nature of the associations between relativism and measures of 
the B-type variables might be more consistent with the hypotheses of the current study.  
For each of the high categories, the relationship between relativism and global B-type 
scores of moral reasoning, as well as relativism and total B element use was investigated 
using various regression analyses in which only those in the high categories were 
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examined. None of the associations reached a level of statistical significance (See Table 
4.6.1 & 4.6.2).  
Table 4.6.1: Binomial Logistic Regression for Variables Predicting the Association 
 between Relativism & Global Score of Moral Reasoning (n = 95) 
 
Global  Scores 
 
Independent Variables 
 
B SE p 
High Equity .026 .042 .540 
 
High Empathy  
 
.098 
 
.069 
 
.152 
 
High Open-mindedness 
 
.077 
 
.072 
 
.284 
    
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
Table 4.6.2: Linear Regression for Variables Predicting the Association between 
Relativism & Total B Element Use (n = 95) 
 
Global  Scores 
 
Independent Variables 
 
B SE p 
High Equity .083 .074 .304 
 
High Empathy  
 
.068 
 
.040 
 
.099 
 
High Open-mindedness 
 
.259 
 
.290 
 
.466 
    
Note: the use of the asterisks identify level of significance *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
With the exception of observed associations between empathy and equity, and empathy and 
open-mindedness (See Table 4.3.1), the results of the current study fail to support the 
hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2. We now turn to a discussion of the results.  
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Chapter 5 
5 Discussion  
The intent of the current study was to investigate the relationship between relativistic 
attitudes and B-type reasoning, a type of reasoning that would likely play a supportive role 
in moral development, as conceptualized by Kohlberg. The vast majority of results failed to 
provide support for the hypotheses. To review, the present study examined 8 sets of 
hypotheses: 
1. Global scores of B-type moral reasoning and scores of B element reasoning will be 
positively associated with scores of relativistic attitudes.  
2. Frequency of the use of the B-type elements intrinsicality, autonomy, mutual 
respect, and reversibility will be positively associated with scores of relativistic 
attitudes. 
3. Frequency of the use of the B-type element, universality, will be inversely related to 
scores of relativistic attitude.  
4. Global scores of B-type moral reasoning and scores of B element reasoning will be 
positively associated with equity scores. 
5. Global scores of B-type moral reasoning and scores of B element reasoning will be 
positively associated with empathy scores. 
6. Global scores of B-type moral reasoning and scores of B element reasoning will be 
positively associated with open-mindedness scores. 
7. Scores of relativism will be positively associated with equity, empathy, and open-
mindedness scores.  
8. The measures of equity, empathy, and open-mindedness will be positively 
associated.  
In general, the results of the analyses indicated that there was almost no support for the 
hypotheses listed above. Of the 80 possible hypothesized associations tested in the analyses 
only 2 reached a level of statistical significance (See Table 4.3.1). In this chapter, the 
limitations, interpretation of the results, and suggestions for future research will be 
discussed.  
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5.1 Limitations of the Study 
Let us first begin by discussing the limitations of the study. It must be noted that the 
findings presented for this research project are not generalizable. They should not be 
considered as representing other university samples, or other populations. In fact, the 
results may be highly variable from one group to another. For example, the university 
sample used in this study is likely from a fairly homogenous, more affluent social class. 
Additionally, the size of the sample used in the current study was small, providing further 
limitation to the findings presented for this thesis. Future research using larger, more varied 
samples would provide more reliable and generalizable results.  
Two additional limitations of the current study are its cross-sectional design and the 
inability of the researcher to score for stage of moral reasoning. Due to the time limitations 
and the extensive training required to score for moral stage, this research project did not 
include the longitudinal design necessary for investigating the development of moral 
reasoning. With suitable training future researchers could modify the design of the present 
study to follow participants longitudinally. This would provide researchers with the 
opportunity to investigate more directly relativistic attitudes as a factor that may inhibit as 
well as promote moral development. This is the case because it would allow researchers to 
score for actual Stage of moral development, as defined by Kohlberg, and perhaps provide 
a better sense of young adults’ moral reasoning capabilities.    
Another factor that may have contributed to the findings reported in the previous section 
were the structured questionnaires used in the present study.  Future research may benefit 
from using semi-structured interviews. Such a strategy, while expensive and time 
consuming, would add considerable insight into the normative judgments individuals make, 
as the researcher would be able to ask probe questions directed at better assessing the 
reasoning behind participants’ answers.  
While not a limitation, it should be noted that the dilemma stimuli used in the current study 
clearly had an influence on participant responses. As previously stated, the current study 
used modified dilemmas from form A (Heinz Dilemma, Joe Dilemma) and form C (Bob 
and Karl Dilemma) of the MJI. Scores from each of the three dilemmas were used to create 
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a global score that was considered to be the participant’s overall type. The results of the 
analysis revealed that the distribution of global scores was relatively even (See Section 
4.1).  When scrutinized more carefully, however, it was found that the participant’s in the 
current study shifted between A-type and B-type moral reasoning across the three moral 
dilemmas. Ninety percent of the respondents were identified as A-type on dilemma one, 
whereas on dilemma two, 92% of participants were identified as B-type. Dilemma 3 was 
the “determining” dilemma in regards to whether a participant’s overall type was A or B; 
however scores for this dilemma were more or less divided between the two types, 
explaining the relatively even distribution of global scores.  
One explanation for these dilemma findings is that people use different moral orientations 
to resolve different dilemmas (Boehm & Nass, 1962; Levine, 1979). Moral orientation 
refers to the source of values that can influence which structure of moral reasoning is used. 
Autonomous, B-type moral reasoning is an orientation that emphasizes a concern for 
persons that compels the individual to use operations like prescriptive role-taking, empathy, 
equity, and sympathy. In contrast to this, heteronomous, A-type moral reasoning is an 
orientation that emphasizes a respect for authority that compels the individual to adhere to 
rules and duties (Kohlberg, 1984).  Given the context of dilemma one (The Heinz 
Dilemma), the majority of participants used heteronomous, A-type moral reasoning which 
was evidenced in their explanations of why Heinz should not steal the drug to save his 
dying wife (i.e. “stealing is against the law”). In contrast to this, the circumstances in 
dilemma 2 (The Joe Dilemma) appeared to elicit autonomous, B-type moral reasoning from 
participants. This was exemplified in participants’ outrage at a father who attempts to take 
hard earned money from his son for personal use. Here B-type moral reasoning is 
evidenced in participants’ arguments for why Joe should not give his father the money (i.e. 
“Joe earned the money himself and should do what he wants with it”).   
Previous research has also suggested that the identity of the protagonists implicated in a 
moral dilemma may result in the use of differing moral orientations (Levine, 1976). In other 
words, depending on the identity of the protagonist, one may expect respondents to 
construct a role-taking standpoint that encourages the use of one moral reasoning type over 
another (Levine, 1976). Therefore, one cannot assume that a specific moral orientation, or 
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related moral structure, will be used consistently by a respondent, given that the 
characteristics of a dilemma may impact their decision. It may be concluded then, that 
different moral orientations exist in the minds of respondents in a compartmentalized 
fashion, especially prior to the post-conventional level, where, according to Kohlberg et al. 
(1984), moral reasoning becomes much more consistent (Levine, 1979). Thus, future 
research should consider the possibility of dilemma effects, as there is evidence that 
suggests people use different modes of reasoning in response to different types of moral 
dilemmas (Levine, 1979; Becker & Fritzsche, 1987; Fritzsche, 1988; Weber, 1990).  
5.2 The Inhibition of Increasing Competency in Moral 
Reasoning 
It will be recalled that the major thrust of the exploratory investigation of the current study 
was concerned with B-type moral reasoning. At Stages 2 through 5 of Kohlberg’s model, 
B-type moral reasoning is characterized by the ability to consider rules critically and in so 
doing actively construct judgments of fairness (Kohlberg et al., 1984). In contrast to A-type 
moral reasoning, the moral judgments produced by B-type reasoning are much less rigid 
and tend to endorse certain moral values that nurture a competent use of various cognitive 
operations considered to be fundamental to the ontogenesis of post-conventional moral 
reasoning (Kohlberg et al., 1984). It is this type of moral reasoning that has prompted the 
current research, committed to investigating factors that may encourage the development of 
mature moral competencies. At the post-conventional level, Stage 6 can be considered a 
fully mature form of B-type reasoning, which emphasizes a value orientation that can be 
called “the principle of respect for persons.” It is important, however, to note that this 
“principle” is not simply an internalized value preference (i.e. at Stage 6 it becomes a 
prescriptive strategy for norming judgments of justice and care, judgments of fairness) 
(Kohlberg, et al., 1986).  
In addition to B-type moral reasoning the present study also focused on relativism in order 
to determine whether or not relativistic attitudes played a role in the development of B-type 
moral reasoning potential. As previously stated, it was expected that relativistic attitudes, at 
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earlier stages of moral development, might stimulate the use of B-type moral reasoning 
because they would nurture an increased sensitivity to the points of view of others.  
In order to convey what might have been the theoretical significance of the present study, 
let us imagine that all the hypotheses that were presented had been supported. If this had 
been the case it would have indicated that, prior to Stages 5 and 6 of moral reasoning, 
relativism was positively associated with pro-social sensitivities as well as with B-type 
moral reasoning competencies. Additionally, it would have indicated that participants’ 
moral reasoning competencies were positively associated with pro-social sensitivities. If 
these positive associations had been observed then it would have been reasonable to 
conclude the following:  
1. The role of relativism must be re-assessed in relation to lower stages of moral 
reasoning, as Kohlberg’s concerns about relativism only apply to the movement 
from Stage 4 to Stage 5 in his model of moral development. 
2. The positive association among the three variables (relativism, B-type moral 
reasoning, and pro-sociality) would imply the existence of complex cognitive 
structures and processes used to respond to moral dilemmas. 
3. We could further assume, given 1 & 2 above, that a reflexive awareness of one’s use 
of these cognitive processes would also develop, given the “actively reconstructed” 
socio-centric character of B-type reasoning (Kohlberg et al., 1984).  
In contrast to the above, however, the actual findings of the present study suggest that, for 
the young adults sampled in this study, there is no cognitive coordination among relativistic 
attitudes, moral reasoning, and pro-social sensitivities. The implication is that these three 
variables represent cognitive structures that are isolated, or compartmentalized from one 
another in this study’s sample. In this context, compartmentalization refers to the co-
existence of cognitive structures and processes that could and should be related but are not.  
The findings of this study are not what were expected nor are they what one would hope 
for. There exists, however, an alternative explanation for the results that can be derived 
from the more macro perspective expressed in the writings of critical sociology. Over the 
last century several notable thinkers, influenced by both Marx and Weber, have concerned 
themselves with the pessimistic observation that man’s reason is being undermined in our 
contemporary world through the increasing domination of instrumental rationality.  
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Theorists such as C. Wright Mills (1959), Max Horkheimer (1947), Theodor Adorno 
(1975), and Anthony Giddens (1984), have all, in their own way, expressed critical concern 
regarding instrumental rationality. They all share a the view that persons in the late modern 
Western world are increasingly conditioned to be concerned with the careful planning of 
their own lives in order to gain the rewards they seek; however they are not nurtured to 
consider whether they ought to be engaged in such pursuits.  In other words, the 
preoccupation with the instrumentally rational is “eclipsing reason,” to paraphrase 
Horkheimer (cited in Applrouth & Edles, 2008). 
The term rationalization refers to the historical process by which reality is increasingly 
mastered by calculation, scientific knowledge and rational action (Applrouth & Edles, 
2008). Rationality is a method of thought focused on the total coordination and control over 
processes needed to attain whatever goal an individual or organization has set for itself 
(Applrouth & Edles, 2008). Rationality, however, attaches little importance to the question 
of whether the purposes for an action are reasonable (Horkheimer, 1947). By reasonable, 
we mean a type of thinking that can coordinate rationality and critical evaluation. Reason 
involves a willingness to imagine or remain open to considering alternative perspectives, a 
willingness to integrate new or revised perspectives into one’s own way of thinking or 
acting, and provides the individual with the ability to assess whether or not they ought to do 
what they know their rational calculations tell them they can do.  
These theorists can be seen as sharing a deep concern that reason, as defined above, is 
being crippled by the instrumental rationality inherent within our society. For instance, in 
The Sociological Imagination (1959), Mills states that human beings in the post-modern era 
can be compared to “cheerful robots,” manipulated and tamed to secure the interests of the 
profit-driven elites, but nevertheless cheerful.  In addition, George Ritzer (2002) states that 
the vast majority of Western civilization has been raised in a world structured by the forces 
of rationalization, which saturates almost every aspect of post-modern life, including birth, 
child-rearing, education, and death.  
While the pursuit of rationality at the neglect of reason can create a condition that stresses 
the moral worth of the individual, it fails to nurture the moral obligation to consider taking 
responsibility for others as well as for one’s relationship with others. The individual 
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becomes the “unit of analysis” and this emphasis on the primacy of the self relativizes “the 
moral” to the individual, discouraging the individual from being concerned with the 
generalization of moral obligation or responsibility. This state of affairs does not bode well 
for moral development, for obvious reasons.  
Kohlberg’s developmental theory is grounded on the assumption that human beings are 
capable of constructing meaningful interpretations of events; that they are able to make 
judgments about these interpretations, and that the judgments they make are based in reason 
(Boyd, 1986; in Wren et al., 1990). For Kohlberg, reason is the active, prescriptive 
evaluation of rationality or rational action. It provides the individual with an ability to 
critically evaluate existing conditions and apply prescriptive “leverage” to change those 
conditions (Boyd, 1986; in Wren et al., 1990). In other words, reason provides guidance in 
ascertaining what one should strive toward, not just what one can do.  
The results of this study do indicate that moral reasoning is not “dead” and that pro-social 
dispositions still exist. However, they also lead one to question whether the B-type 
reasoning exhibited in the sample tested here is as “actively reconstructed” as it is supposed 
to be.  Given the sociological concerns just expressed, it may be necessary to consider the 
possibility that B-type reasoning is just as rote and uncritical as A-type reasoning, but 
simply “disguised” as autonomous. If the sample was using B-type moral reasoning, as 
defined by Kohlberg, it should have at least been strongly associated with the equity, 
empathy, and open-mindedness variables. This association would have then implied a 
socio-centric, reflexive awareness used to actively reconstruct judgments regarding moral 
dilemmas, and not simply a parroting of culturally sanctioned norms. In other words, the 
lack of coordination among the variables tested in the present study may indicate that the 
B-type reasoning generated by our sample did not really represent autonomous, normative 
judgments regarding what behaviors are better than others, what goals are more morally 
defensible, and what people ought to believe and do. As previously stated, future research 
using semi-structured interviews would add considerable insight, as the researcher would 
be able to ask probe questions directed at assessing participant’s reasoning.  
Future research will hopefully benefit from the analyses presented here, and will be able to 
move forward and investigate the sociological factors that may impede moral development 
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and moral reasoning. Additionally, it is hoped that the current study will provide new 
methodological techniques that will aid future research in investigating the relationship 
between moral development and relativism.  
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Appendix A: Letter of Information 
 
Welcome to our survey! We are investigating how personal beliefs are related to specific 
judgments people offer to others about social situations. 
 
To participate in this study you must be enrolled as an undergraduate at UWO and be between 
the age of 17 and 30. 
 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete the following online survey. 
The survey contains questions regarding social problems and matters of personal opinion 
regarding morals and social forces. It will take about 30 minutes to complete 
 
Data will be collected using a certified online host that encrypts all information to ensure 
confidentiality and anonymity of all participants. 
 
There are no known risks to your participation in this study. There is some possibility that a 
dilemma used may upset a respondent; however, we believe this to be highly unlikely. In the 
event a respondent is upset by a dilemma, please contact any of the resources listed below. 
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer any 
questions or withdraw from the study at any time with no effect on your academic status. All 
information obtained will be treated as strictly confidential, and at the end of the study this 
information will be destroyed. 
 
Your consent to participate in this study will be given as a result of clicking on the link below. 
 
If you have any questions about the conduct of this study or your rights as a research 
participant, you may contact me, the chief investigator, or the Office of Research Ethics. 
 
 
Consent to Participate... 
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Appendix B: Demographic Information 
The following questions ask you some basic information about yourself. 
1. What is your current age? 
17-20 
21-24 
25-28 
29+ 
2. Please indicate your gender 
Male 
Female 
Other 
3. I am currently enrolled in... 
First Year 
Second Year 
Third Year 
Fourth Year 
4. In which discipline are you enrolled? (For Example, Psychology, Sociology, Geography) 
 
Ready to submit. 
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Appendix C: Kohlberg’s Dilemmas 
 
Instructions: Below are 3 dilemmas. Please read each one carefully and answer the 
questions that follow each dilemma in the spaces provided. Respond to the questions 
briefly then move on to the NEXT SECTION. 
 
In London ON, a young woman is near death due to a rare form of cancer. There is one drug 
that doctors know might save her, a drug that a pharmacologist has recently discovered. The 
pharmacologist is charging ten times (10x) the amount of what the drug costs to produce. The 
sick woman's husband has been to everyone they know to ask if he can borrow the money, but 
has not been able to collect enough. In desperation, the husband goes to see the 
pharmacologist. The husband explains that his wife is dying and asks the pharmacologist to sell 
the drug to him for less, or let him pay later. The pharmacologist, however, refuses. 
 
After attempting every legal option, the husband is thinking about stealing the drug. 
 
1. Should the husband steal the drug? 
Yes 
No 
Why or Why Not? 
 
2. Does the husband have a duty to his wife to steal the drug? 
Yes 
No 
Why or Why Not?   
 
3. What if the person who was dying was a stranger to the husband? Should the 
husband steal the drug for them? (Briefly explain). 
  
The husband stole the drug and gave it to his wife. He was arrested and eventually 
brought to court. A jury finds him guilty of theft, and it is now up to the Judge to sentence him. 
 
1. Should the judge sentence the husband or let him go, free of charge? 
Sentence the husband 
Let the husband go, free of charge 
Explain your choice:  
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2. When people disagree, is everybody's opinion equally right? 
Yes 
No 
Why or Why Not? 
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Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he 
could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and 
saved up the amount it cost to go to camp, plus a little extra. But just before camp was going to 
start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, 
and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he 
had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thinks of 
refusing to give his father the money. 
 
1. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? 
Yes 
No 
Why or Why Not? 
   
2. Does Joe's father have the right to tell his son to give him the money? 
Yes 
No 
Why or Why Not? 
  
3. Is the fact that Joe earned the money himself important in this situation? 
Yes 
No 
Why or Why Not? 
 
4. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son? 
Yes 
No 
Why or Why Not? 
   
5. In general, why should a promise be kept? 
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Two young men, brothers, had got into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a 
hurry and needed money. Karl, the older brother, broke into a store and stole a thousand 
dollars. Bob, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. 
He told the man that he was very sick and that he needed a thousand dollars to pay for an 
operation. Bob asked the old man to lend him the money and promised that he would pay him 
back when he recovered. Really Bob wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the 
man back. Although the old man didn't know Bob very well, he lent him the money. So Bob and 
Karl skipped town, each with a thousand dollars. 
 
1. If you had to say which brother behaved worse, would you choose Karl for breaking 
into a store and stealing, or Bob for borrowing money with no intention of paying it 
back? 
  
2. Which should the law be harsher against, stealing like Karl did, or lying to cheat 
someone out of money, like Bob? 
  
3. Is it important to keep a promise to someone you don't know well, or will never see 
again? 
Yes 
No 
Why or Why Not? 
   
4. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store? 
  
5. Should people do everything they can to obey the law? 
Yes 
No 
Why or Why Not?   
 
 
Ready to submit. 
 Appendix D: Score Sheet
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Appendix E: The Triadic Measure of Equity Sensitivity (TMES) 
Instructions: The statements below refer to what you would like your relationship to 
be with any other individual for which you may or may not know. For each statement 
below, allocate 10 points among the three choices (A, B or C). you can assign the 10 
points any way you wish, including zeros, as long as you allocate a total of 10 points 
for each set of three statements.  
 
When I interact with others, it would be most important for me to:  
A. Get something from them  
 
B. Give something to them  
 
C. Give as much to them as I get from them 
 
It would be most important for me to:  
A. Help others 
 
B. Help others while taking care of my own needs 
 
C. Watch out for my own good 
 
I would be most concerned about:  
A. Receiving from others that which is equal to what I contribute to them 
 
B. What I contribute to others 
 
C. What I receive from others 
 
The hard work I do should:  
A. Benefit others 
 
B. Benefit me and others equally 
 
C. Benefit me 
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My personal philosophy in dealing with others is:  
A. If I don't look out for myself, no one will 
 
B. It's better for me to give than to receive 
 
C. I should work hard and look out for myself 
 
 
Ready to submit. 
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Appendix F: The Toronto Empathy Questionnaire (TEQ) 
Instructions: Below is a list of statements. Please read each statement carefully and 
rate how frequently you feel or act in the manner described. Please answer each 
statement as honestly as you can.  
  Never 
 
0 
Rarely 
 
1 
Sometimes 
 
2 
Often 
 
3 
Always 
 
4 
When someone else is feeling excited, I tend to get excited too.  
     
Other people's misfortunes do not disturb me a great deal  
     
It upsets me to see someone being treated disrespectfully. 
     
I remain unaffected when someone close to me is happy. 
     
I enjoy making other people feel better. 
     
I have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
     
When a friend starts to talk about his/her problems, I try to steer the 
conversation towards something else.      
I can tell when others are sad even when they do not say anything. 
     
I find that I am "in tune" with other people's moods. 
     
I do not feel sympathy for people who cause their own serious illnesses. 
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I become irritated when someone cries. 
     
I am not really interested in how other people feel. 
     
I get a strong urge to help when I see someone who is upset. 
     
When I see someone being treated unfairly, I do not feel very much pity 
for them.      
I find it silly for people to cry out of happiness. 
     
When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective 
towards him/her.      
Ready to submit. 
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Appendix G: The Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) 
 
Instructions: Please use the 1 to 5 point scale to indicate the degree to which you 
agree or disagree with each statement below. 
  Disagree 
Strongly 
1 
Disagree 
 
2 
Neutral 
 
3 
Agree 
 
4 
Agree 
Strongly 
5 
There are no ethical principles important enough to be a part of any 
universal code of ethics.      
What is ethical varies from one situation and society to another 
     
Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one 
person considers moral may be judged to be immoral by another 
person, and that is OK. 
     
Different morals cannot be compared to each other in an attempt to 
establish which are more right, or “better.”      
Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be resolved, 
since what is moral or immoral is up to the individual.      
Moral standards are simply personal rules that indicate how a person 
should behave. They cannot be applied in making judgments about 
others. 
     
Ethical considerations in interpersonal relationships are very 
complex; individuals should be allowed to create their own, 
individual codes. 
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Rigidly adhering to ethical positions that prevent certain actions 
could stand in the way of better human relations.      
Whether a lie is permissible or not depends on the situation. No 
rules about lying can be formulated.      
Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends upon the 
circumstances surrounding the action.      
 
Ready to submit. 
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Appendix H: The Short Form Dogmatism Scale (DS) 
 
Instructions: The following questions are concerned with your opinion about social 
forces. Please read each statement and indicate how strongly you agree or disagree 
with each one. 
  Disagree 
Very 
Much 
 
1 
 
Disagree 
on the 
Whole 
 
2 
Disagree 
a Little 
 
 
3 
Agree a 
Little 
 
 
4 
Agree on 
the 
Whole 
 
5 
Agree 
Very 
Much 
 
6 
In this complicated world of ours the only way we 
can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or 
experts who can be trusted. 
      
My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly 
refuses to admit they are wrong.       
There are two kinds of people in this world: those 
who are for the truth and those who are against 
the truth. 
      
Most people just don't know what's good for them. 
      
Of all the different philosophies that exist in this 
world there is probably only one which is correct.       
The highest form of government is a democracy 
and the highest form of democracy is a 
government run by those who are most intelligent. 
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The main thing in life is for a person to want to do 
something important.       
I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me 
how to solve my personal problems.       
Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays 
aren't worth the paper they are printed on.       
Man on his own is a helpless and miserable 
creature.       
It is only when a person devotes himself to an 
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.       
Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. 
      
To compromise with our political opponents is 
dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal 
of our own side. 
      
It is often desirable to reserve judgment about 
what's going on until one has had a chance to hear 
the opinions of those one respects. 
      
The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It 
is only the future that counts.       
The United States and Russia have just about 
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nothing in common. 
In a discussion, I often find it necessary to repeat 
myself several times to make sure I am being 
understood. 
      
While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my 
secret ambition is to become a great person, like 
Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare. 
      
Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a 
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to 
restrict the freedom of certain political groups. 
      
It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live 
coward.       
 
Ready to submit. 
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Appendix I: The Social Desirability Scale (SDS) 
Instructions: Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes 
and traits. Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it 
pertains to you personally. It's best to go with your first judgment and not spend too 
long mulling over any one question. 
Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. 
True 
False 
I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. 
True 
False 
It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
True 
False 
I have never intensely disliked anyone. 
True 
False 
On occasions I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. 
True 
False 
I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
True 
False 
I am always careful about my manner of dress. 
True 
False 
My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant. 
True 
False 
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If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do it. 
True 
False 
On a few occasions, I have given up something because I thought too little of my ability. 
True 
False 
I like to gossip at times. 
True 
False 
There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew 
they were right. 
True 
False 
No matter who I'm talking to, I’m always a good listener. 
True 
False 
I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. 
True 
False 
There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
True 
False 
I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
True 
False 
I always try to practice what I preach. 
True 
False 
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I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loudmouthed, obnoxious people. 
True 
False 
I sometimes try to "get even," rather than forgive and forget. 
True 
False 
When I don't know something I don't mind at all admitting it. 
True 
False 
I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
True 
False 
At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. 
True 
False 
There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. 
True 
False 
I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrong-doings. 
True 
False 
I never resent being asked to return a favour. 
True 
False 
I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 
True 
False 
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I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. 
True 
False 
There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
True 
False 
I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. 
True 
False 
I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me. 
True 
False 
I have never felt that I was punished without cause. 
True 
False 
I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. 
True 
False 
I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. 
True 
False 
 
Ready to submit 
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Appendix J: Debrief 
Thank you for your participation!  
The study you have just participated in was designed to investigate the relationship 
between people’s moral point of view and how it influences judgments. Specifically, we 
are investigating your moral attitudes and the moral judgments you make about 
dilemmas. 
All data have been coded numerically to ensure confidentiality. It is impossible for your 
results and scores to be identified personally. If you wish, once the data are analyzed 
you may obtain a copy of the average data collected by contacting me. As well, if you 
wish to withdraw from the study now, your questionnaire will be destroyed. 
If you have any questions regarding this study and its rationale, please contact me, or 
Dr. Levine. 
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